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ABSTRACT
The advancement of technology in the contemporary era has
facilitated the emergence of information warfare, which includes the
deployment of information as a weapon against an adversary. This
is done using a number of tactics such as the use of media and social
media to spread propaganda and disinformation against an
adversary as well as the adoption of software hacking techniques to
spread viruses and malware into the strategically important
computer systems of an adversary either to steal confidential data or
to damage the adversary’s security system. Due to the intangible
nature of the damage caused by the information warfare operations,
it becomes challenging for international law to regulate the
information warfare operations. The unregulated nature of
information operations allows information warfare to be used
effectively by states and nonstate actors to gain advantage over their
adversaries. Information warfare also enhances the lethality of
hybrid warfare. Therefore, it is the need of the hour to arrange a new
convention or devise a new set of rules to regulate the sphere of
information warfare to avert the potential damage that it can cause
to international peace and security.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Information warfare is a combination of multifarious
strategies aimed at harming the reputation or informational
infrastructure of an adversary.1 This tactic can be employed in
times of both peace and war.2 In particular, the information
warfare strategy is relied upon widely by the actors of hybrid
warfare.3 States and nonstate actors involved in waging hybrid
warfare employ information warfare tactics either to demonize
their adversary by spreading disinformation, fake news, and
propaganda or to harm the online security protocols of their
adversary.4 For instance, surreptitious and sudden online attacks
on an adversary’s cyberspace via hacking, the stealing of an
adversary’s confidential data adversary, or the deployment of
social media campaigns to spread rumors against the adversary
are some of the various tactics pursued within the sphere of
information warfare.5 In short, information warriors rely on using
information as a precursor to causing intangible damage to the
adversary.6 The intangible damage can, sometimes, also bring
tangible damage with it. For instance a virus attack on the
command and control systems of an enemy’s jet fighters can hinder
1. See LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG ET AL., INFORMATION WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
1 (1998).
2. VINCENT F. HENDRICKS & MADS VESTERGAARD, REALITY LOST: MARKETS OF ATTENTION,
MISINFORMATION AND MANIPULATION 69 (2018).
3. See, e.g., Przemyslaw Furgacz, Russian Information War in the Ukrainian Conflict, in
COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM UKRAINE 207 (Niculae Iancu et al. eds.,
2016).
4. See id. See also Cristian Barna, The Road to Jihad in Syria: Using SOCMINT to Counter
the Radicalization of Muslim Youth in Romania, in COUNTERING RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT
EXTREMISM AMONG YOUTH TO PREVENT TERRORISM 193 (Marco Lombardi et al. eds., 2015).
5. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
6. Alexander Nitu, International Legal Issues and Approaches Regarding Information
Warfare, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION WARFARE
AND SECURITY 201 (2011).
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pilots in controlling planes, which can result in crashes and
possibly causing human casualties.7 In such an event, the law of
armed conflict would be applied as the nature of the damage has
turned from intangible to tangible.8 On the other hand, when the
impact of information operations is intangible damage, there are
challenges in regulating information warfare under the authority
of international law.9
Additionally, the right to freedom of opinion and expression,
the common heritage of mankind (“CHM”) principle, and the
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty create restrictions for
international law in regulating the operations of information
warfare.10 These restrictions make it difficult to legally bring
information warfare within the regulation of the norms, rules, and
principles of international law.11 Consequently, information
operations become unrestricted in their scope and functioning,
which poses risks to international peace and security. This is
because a lack of regulation can make the use of information
warfare strategies uncontrolled, inviting rival states to use them
against each other unrestrictedly.12 The risks to peace and security
deepen when information operations are installed by militant
terrorists and anti-state actors.13 Therefore, it is essential that the
international community unites to legislate new rules regulating
the conduct of states and nonstate actors whenever they use the
strategies and tools of information warfare against any state or
entity. The underlying challenges in doing so can be met through
arranging a new convention on the issue and holding dialogues

7. E.g., Michael J. Robbat, Resolving the Legal Issues Concerning the use of Information
Warfare in the International Forum: The Reach of the Existing Legal Framework, and the
Creation of a New Paradigm, 6 B. U. J. SCI & TECH. L. 26 (2000).
8. Id. at 13.
9. See, e.g., GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4. See also Phillip A. Johnson, Is it Time
for a Treaty on Information Warfare?, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 439 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell eds., 2010).
10. Id.
11. Johnson, supra note 9, at 445-46.
12. Nitu, supra note 6, at 200-01.
13. M.A. Hannan Bin Azhar & Thomas Edward Allen Barton, Forensic Analysis of
Secure Ephemeral Messaging Applications on Android Platforms, in GLOBAL SECURITY, SAFETY
AND SUSTAINABILITY: THE SECURITY CHALLENGES OF THE CONNECTED WORLD 27 (Hamid
Jahankhani et al. eds., 2017).
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among states to control the unrestricted arena of the information
operations.14
This Article will include an exploration of the different
operations of information warfare. It will also include an
explanation of how challenging it has become for international law
to regulate information operations. After a brief introduction to the
whole Article in the Part I, Part II will include the definition of
information warfare and information operations. Part III will
highlight some of the major information operations and strategies
of information warriors that are being carried out in the current
era. Part IV will discuss how significantly the arena of information
warfare has revolutionized the concept of warfare in the current
era and how substantially the information operations are
augmenting the lethality of hybrid warfare. Part V will include an
evaluation of the key challenges that are being faced by
international law, especially by the international law of armed
conflict, in regulating information warfare. Finally, Part VI will
include some suggestions for regulating information operations,
primarily by bringing the sphere of information warfare under the
broad umbrella of international law. Inferences will be drawn at
the end of the Article.
II. WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE?
Information warfare is a set of contemporary tactics adopted
by states as well as nonstate actors to achieve competitive
advantage over their adversaries.15 These tactics can be deployed
with or without the use of force.16 Generally, information warfare
causes intangible damage to the adversary by deteriorating its
reputation through propaganda, disinformation, or “fake news,”
which is carried out via the use of mass media, social media, or
similar.17 However, when the software intrusion methods are used

14. See generally Johnson, supra note 9.
15. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
16. Markku Jokisipila, E-Jihad, Cyberterrorism and Freedom of Speech, in WAR, VIRTUAL
WAR AND SOCIETY: THE CHALLENGE TO COMMUNITIES 94 (Andrew R. Wilson & Mark L. Perry
eds., 2008).
17. See Nitu, supra note 6, at 204. See also Anna-Marie Jansen van Vuuren et al., The
Susceptibility of the South African Media to Be Used as a Tool for Information Warfare, in
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to cause damage to the strategically or economically important
computer data systems of an adversary, then that intangible
damage from information warfare can sometimes also produce
tangible damage to the adversary.18 This happens in particular
when the military command and control systems of an adversary
are attacked with malware or viruses.19 If such an attack is
launched on weaponry systems such as computer control systems
of fighter jets or other expensive military tools, then the damage
can be tangible and produce heavy financial losses.20 Human
casualties can also result if weapon systems become out of
control—e.g., the crashing of jet planes.21
The emergence of information warfare operations can be
ascribed to advancements in technology, as most of the dangerous
information warfare tactics include the use of advanced
technological tools. For instance, the spread of malware, viruses,
etc. requires modern computer hacking technologies.22 Thus,
technology is used or misused against an adversary with the
intention of either causing intangible damage to the adversary or
gaining competitive or strategic advantage over it.23
A. Definition of Information Warfare
There is no unanimously accepted definition of information
warfare so far. Nonetheless, the definitions presented by the US
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US Air Force are, to some extent, famous
in the scholarly world.24 The former regards information warfare
as “information operations” and defines it as “the integrated
employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION WARFARE AND SECURITY
127 (Robert Erra ed., 2012).
18. Robbat, supra note 7, at 8–13.
19. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–2.
20. Robbat, supra note 7, at 8–13.
21. Id.
22. DR. YANA KOROBKO & MAHMOUD MUSA, THE SHIFTING GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER:
PERILS OF A WORLD WAR AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES 105 (2014).
23. See generally ROGER DEAN THRASHER, INFORMATION WARFARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
FORGING THE TOOLS (1996). See also GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
24. See details provided in the text under the footnote 5 in Christopher Joyner &
Catherine Lotrionte, Information Warfare as International Coercion: Elements of a Legal
Framework, 827 EUR. J. INT’L L. 825-65 (2001).
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psychological operations, military deception, and operations
security, in concert with specified supporting and related
capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial
human and automated decision making while protecting our
own.”25 On the other hand, the US Air Force has defined
information warfare as “any action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or
destroy the enemy’s information and its functions; protecting
ourselves against those actions; and exploiting our own military
information functions.”26
These definitions suggest that information warfare is a set of
techniques that employ information to achieve strategic or
competitive advantage over an adversary. Additionally, the above
provided definitions also suggest that gaining such competitive
advantage also requires ensuring adequate security from the
information operations of the adversary.27 Hence, the
strengthening of security systems would play an essential role in
the quest to gain advantage over an adversary in the arena of
information warfare.
B. Difference Between Information Warfare and Cyberwarfare
Although there are some similarities between information
warfare and cyberwarfare, the scopes of the two fields are
significantly different. Information warfare is an older
phenomenon than cyberwarfare and has been a fundamental part
of conventional war throughout the course of history.28 On the
other hand, cyberwarfare is a relatively new phenomenon, because
it has emerged only since the invention of the internet and
computers, unlike a number of information warfare operations,
which existed long before.29

25. For details, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY TERMS
261 (2009). See also MARCO BOSCINI & LEVERHULME TRUST, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (2014).
26. ATHINA KARATZOGIANNI, THE POLITICS OF CYBERCONFLICT 100 (2006).
27. Id.
28. David R. Mets, AIRPOWER AND TECHNOLOGY: SMART AND UNMANNED WEAPONS: SMART
AND UNMANNED WEAPONS 139 (2008).
29. Ryan White et al., The Difference Between Cyber and Information Warfare, C YBER
S ECURITY & L. P OL ’ Y (Feb. 20, 2018), https://blog.cybersecuritylaw.us/2018/02/20/thedifference-between-cyber-and-information-warfare [https://perma.cc/3CDP-J6AY].
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Primarily, in the sphere of information operations, it is
information that is used as a weapon against an adversary.30 In this
regard, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff have recognized three distinct
elements of the information operations: these include the physical,
cognitive, and informational arenas.31 The list of endeavors that
can be carried out in the sphere of information warfare is quite
extensive and includes disseminating propaganda, “fake news,” or
disinformation through media and social media.32 It also includes
spreading malware and viruses and making denial-of-service
(“DDoS”) attacks on the military command and control systems of
an adversary.33 On the other hand, cyberwarfare only includes
reliance on internet and computers as a means of gaining strategic
competitive advantage over an adversary.34 Cyberwarfare relies on
DDoS attacks, computer viruses, hacking, and malware attacks on
an adversary’s strategically important computer systems.35 Thus,
information warfare is a bigger umbrella, including print and
electronic media, computers, software, surveillance, and
espionage, while the scope of cyberwarfare is limited to the
internet and computers.36 Cyberwarfare is also only one dimension
or discipline in the multidimensional field of information warfare;
however, owing to the worldwide emergence of technological
revolution, cyberwarfare in the broad spectrum of information
warfare is crucially important and, therefore, cannot be
neglected.37

30. Rex Mbuthia, Cyber Warfare Versus Information Warfare: Two Very Different
Concepts, LINKEDIN (July 16, 2017,) https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/cyber-warfareversus-information-two-very-different-concepts-mbuthia
[https://perma.cc/4QFJYZ2W].
31. See ISAAC PORCHE ET AL., REDEFINING INFORMATION WARFARE BOUNDARIES FOR AN
ARMY IN A WIRELESS WORLD 12 (2013).
32. See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–2.
33. See id.
34. See STEVE WINTERFELD & JASON ANDRESS, THE BASICS OF CYBER WARFARE:
UNDERSTANDING THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CYBER WARFARE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 16 (2012).
35. See White et al., supra note 29.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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III. SOME MAJOR TACTICS OF INFORMATION WARFARE
Information warfare is a complicated arena which relies on
numerous tactics that are employed against an adversary.38 It is
pertinent to mention here that the tactics of information warfare are also
being adopted in waging hybrid warfare.39 Thus the similarity of the
tactics of information warfare and hybrid warfare indicates toward a
close mutual relationship that exists between these two arenas of
unconventional warfare.40 The most common of these tactics are
elucidated below.
A. Use of Media
According to Aki-Mauri Huhtinen, information warfare
always entails certain objectives aimed at an adversary.41 These
objectives primarily include waging propaganda and
disinformation against a rival.42 For this purpose, manipulated
information is disseminated against an adversary through certain
mediums, among which mainstream media appears the greatest.43
A certain kind of perception is crafted of the adversary, which is
realized through the use of print and electronic media sources.44
1. Psychological Warfare
The media is also regarded as a tool of psychological warfare,
because the narrative among the people—shaped by the media—
fundamentally affects their psychological comprehension of a
particular situation.45 Primarily, it is the media that shapes
people’s opinions about any incident, activity, or situation. The
media can also incite the sentiments of the public by spreading
hatred-oriented information among them about a particular
38.
39.
40.
41.

See, e.g., Furgacz, supra note 3, at 207.
Id. at 215.
Id.
For details, see Aki-Mauri Huhtinen, Different Types of Information Warfare, in
ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT: CONCEPTS, METHODOLOGIES, TOOLS, AND APPLICATIONS: CONCEPTS,
METHODOLOGIES, TOOLS, AND APPLICATIONS 291 (Anttiroiko Ari-Veikko ed., 2008).
42. See GREENBERG et al., supra note 1, at 1.
43. See Vuuren et al., supra note 17.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., WAEL ABDELAL, HAMAS AND THE MEDIA: POLITICS AND STRATEGY 145-46
(2016).
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activity or situation.46 For example, the media can incite patriotic
sentiments among people by spreading hatred-oriented
disinformation about a competitor nation.47 The masses may start
to believe the disinformation, particularly when the majority of the
people have no direct access to the correct information about that
particular adversary. Such incidents are observed in totalitarian
states, where the government has full control over the media and
allows the display of only manipulated content and news on TV
channels.48
2. The Application of the Framing Theory: Relationship Between
Media and Foreign Policy
The use of media as a tool of information warfare is also
regarded as soft part of information warfare.49 To explain this
further, the “framing theory” becomes applicable.50 That is, the
media frames a particular activity or entity of having certain
attributions and promotes its manipulated interpretations of that
activity.51 Such framing can either demonize or glorify that entity
depending upon the negative or positive framing of that entity by
media, respectively.52
Often, the framing theory becomes relevant in shaping the
determinants of nations’ foreign policy, in which adversary states
are regarded as evil and negative, while friendly states are given a
positive reputation. This is constructed with or without the use of
proper factual information.53 The foreign policy of the state is
shaped by various factors, such as the geopolitics of the state,
46. For example, media can incite patriotic sentiments among the public. For details,
see LYN GORMAN & DAVID MCLEAN, MEDIA AND SOCIETY INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: A HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION 82 (2d ed. 2009).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., id.
49. For details, see Huhtinen, supra note 41, at 292.
50. To understand the framing theory, see Ingrid Volkmer, Framing Theory, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNICATION THEORY 408 (Stephen W. Littlejohn & Karen A. Foss eds.,
2009).
51. Ashli Quesinberry Stokes, Clinton, Post-Feminism, and Rhetorical Reception on the
Campaign Trail, in THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN: A COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE 133
(Robert E. Denton, Jr. ed., 2009).
52. Id.
53. INGA VON DER STEIN, THE MEDIA AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INFORMATION WARFARE (2016),
available at https://www.grin.com/document/337247 [https://perma.cc/VN6S-2RSV].
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which, of course, are obviously accounted by the media in
spreading any narrative about any aspect or issue.54 However,
foreign policy and the media’s narratives are significantly
influenced by “the political and economic systems of the state.”55
This is evident from the Cold War era, especially during Ronald
Reagan’s reign in power, when the US media vehemently opposed
the socialist and communist agendas of the Soviet Union.56 In that
era, rigorous media campaigns demonizing communist theories
were launched by the US mass media.57 At the same time, US
governmental agencies, especially the Central Intelligence Agency
(“CIA”), also supported antisocialist narratives.58 Both the US
media and the government’s foreign policy were “framing” the
Soviet Union and its communist agenda as a threat to the entire
world.59 In fact, the threat did not loom over the entire world but
only over the capitalist system prevalent in the United States
during the Cold War era, and the democratic political system of the
United States could not afford any kind of demise of the capitalist
system.60 Thus, for the strength and dominance of its capitalist
system in opposition to the Soviet Union’s communism and
socialism, the US government relied on its media to launch
information warfare against the Soviet’s communism.
Concomitantly, the US media relied on the information available to
it, as interpreted in accordance with US foreign policy regarding
the threats posed by socialism and communism to the capitalist
economic and democratic political system of the United States.61
Consequently, the US media launched antisocialist and
anticommunist propaganda campaigns against the Soviet Union.62
Thus, the framing of a particular issue in the foreign policy of a
state is reflected in the information disseminated by the media
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. NANCY BERNHARD, U.S. TELEVISION NEWS AND COLD WAR PROPAGANDA, 1947–1960,
43-45 (2003).
57. Id.
58. Id. See also GORMAN & MCLEAN, supra note 46, at 133,
59. See GORMAN & MCLEAN, supra note 46, at 133.
60. See JAMES R. ARNOLD & ROBERTA WIENER, COLD WAR: THE ESSENTIAL REFERENCE
GUIDE, XIII (2012). See also SAM AARONOVITCH & RON SMITH, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BRITISH
CAPITALISM: A MARXIST ANALYSIS 143 (1981).
61. For example, as described by GORMAN & MCLEAN, supra note 46, at 133.
62. Id.
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about that issue.63 Furthermore, by relying on such media agencies,
it becomes quite convenient for a state to launch information
warfare via disinformation and propaganda against its adversary.
B. Reliance on Social Media Platforms
In the contemporary era, owing to the rise of technology and
the consequent emergence of smartphones and the use of the
internet, social media has appeared as one of the most prominent
sources of the dissemination of information.64 An estimated 3.5
billion people, or nearly half of the human population, use social
media.65 In particular, Facebook has 2.4 billion users, YouTube has
1.9 billion, and WhatsApp, owned by Facebook, has 1.6 billion.
These are the most commonly used social media platforms.66
These forums are the quickest modes of information dissemination
as they allow any information to go viral within only a few hours.67
Furthermore, there are no significant costs associated with the use
of almost all of the social media platforms.68 Social media forums
are very convenient and simple to use, and do not require any
proper identity verification of the individuals who make the
information go viral.69 Furthermore, the information disseminated
through social media platforms keeps on reaching a larger
audience. That is, the information can be shared on and on and thus
creates a multiplier effect in terms of the number of people it can
reach.70 Therefore, social media is considered a quick way of
63. See STEIN, supra note 53.
64. Eda Turanci, Consumption in the Digital Age: A Research on Social Media
Influencers, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON CONSUMPTION, MEDIA, AND POPULAR CULTURE IN THE
GLOBAL AGE 269 (Ozlen Ozgen ed., 2019).
65. See Simon Kemp, Digital 2019: Q2 Global Digital Statshot, D IGITAL P ORTAL (Apr.
25, 2019), https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2019-q2-global-digital-statshot
[https://perma.cc/3GEG-TXMW].
66. Id.
67. See Jethro Tan et al., Building National Resilience in the Digital Era of Violent
Extremism: Systems and People, in COMBATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION IN THE
DIGITAL ERA 316 (Majeed Khader et al. eds., 2016).
68. See JASON FALLS & ERIK DECKERS, NO BULLSHIT SOCIAL MEDIA: THE ALL-BUSINESS, NOHYPE GUIDE TO SOCIAL MEDIA MARKETING 233 (2011).
69. Id. Read about fake identities on social media as described by R.J. PARKER & J.J.
SLATE, SOCIAL MEDIA MONSTERS: INTERNET KILLERS 185 (2014).
70. Automated bot software is also used for this purpose. To read more about bots,
see Stefano De Paoli, A Comparison and a Framework for Investigating Bots in Social
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disseminating information to a large number of audiences.71 It is
regarded as one of the most essential tools of information
warfare.72
Additionally, another feature is paid campaigns on certain
social media websites such as Facebook, which facilitates paid
promotion of the content shared on Facebook.73 This feature
makes the shared content visible to a higher number of Facebook
users.74 The price to be paid for such social media campaigns
promoting particular content is too small.75 As campaigns make the
content reach a larger audience,76 they are used by information
warriors to wage informational attacks on their adversaries.77
These informational attacks mainly include the spread of
disinformation and propaganda on social media against an
adversary.78 If propaganda or disinformation is spread so as to
incite or challenge the religious or ideological inclinations of a
nation, then such propaganda can urge them to protest against the
individuals sharing propaganda on social media. The resharing of
content on social media may further aggravate their emotions and
make the information go viral, reaching more people and thus
inviting stronger reactions. Such utilization of social media can
prove to be detrimental for peace when it is employed by anti-state
actors to spread propaganda against the state.79 Herein, social
media appears a negative and lethal component of information
warfare as it allows any information to go viral, demonize the

Networks Sites and MMOGs, in HANDBOOK ON 3D3C PLATFORMS: APPLICATIONS AND TOOLS FOR
THREE DIMENSIONAL SYSTEMS FOR COMMUNITY, CREATION AND COMMERCE 60 (Yesha Sivan ed.,
2015).
71. JAY LEVINSON, GUERRILLA SOCIAL MEDIA MARKETING: 100+ WEAPONS TO GROW YOUR
ONLINE INFLUENCE, ATTRACT CUSTOMERS, AND DRIVE PROFITS xii (2010).
72. See Vuuren et al., supra note 17.
73. For details, see KRIS OLIN, FACEBOOK ADVERTISING GUIDE 36 (2009).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Vuuren et al., supra note 17.
78. TOBY MATTHIESEN, SECTARIAN GULF: BAHRAIN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND THE ARAB SPRING
THAT WASN’T 33 (2013).
79. SIMON HARDING, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON YOUTH GANG BEHAVIOR, VIOLENCE, AND
WEAPONS USE 117 (2016).
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reputation of an adversary within a short passage of time, and
incite the emotions of the general public into uproar and tumult.80
C. Intrusion of Cyberspace
The intrusion of cyberspace is another tactical move regarded
as an element of information warfare.81 The practice of intruding
on cyberspace is dependent on technology. The intrusion of
cyberspace is when the strategically important computer systems
of an adversary are attacked with viruses or malware via hacking.82
Many examples of such incidents can be found in recent history
and are continuing today. For instance, according to the US
Department of Defense, the Pentagon has to foil around 36 million
email breaches on a daily basis to secure their computer
networking systems from hackers.83 This highlights the serious
nature of the threats posed by technology to the security systems
of a state.84 Therefore, every state tries to maintain strict security
over its strategically important data systems.
D. Data Theft
Data theft is also one of the prominent tactics of information
warriors.85 This tactic is motivated by the goal of either thieving
confidential and strategically important information from an
adversary or stealing funds from the bank accounts of a rival.86 The
consequences may produce intangible damage in terms of stealing
strategically important information and may leave the affected
party at a strategic disadvantage compared to its rivals.87
Sometimes, the data theft is politically motivated and is aimed at
maneuvering or affecting political situations. A recent example of
80. Id.
81. See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
82. Id.
83. Frank R. Konkel, Pentagon Thwarts 36 Million Email Breach Attempts Daily,
NEXTGOV.COM,
(Jan.
11,
2018),
https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2018/01/pentagon-thwarts-36-million-emailbreach-attempts-daily/145149 [https://perma.cc/63U6-6EPE].
84. Id.
85. See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
86. Id.
87. See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
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such data theft is the Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which the
data of as many as 87,000 Facebook users was accessed by one of
the board members of the firm Cambridge Analytica.88 This data
was used for the presidential election campaign of Donald Trump
in 2016.89 According to the investigation reports, the data was
accessed through an online software application created by an
independent researcher and lecturer at Cambridge University,
Alexandr Kogan.90 The name of the application was “This Is Your
Digital Life” and it was basically a personality test application.91
The app became famous among Facebook users and whoever
accessed and used the app for a personality test unintentionally
gave his/her entire Facebook data and that of his/her Facebook
friends to Kogan’s app; Kogan later shared this data with
Cambridge Analytica.92 Primarily, the data was of US and UK
citizens.93 This occurred in 2015, when Donald Trump’s political
team was busy in the election campaign, and one of the members
of Trump’s political team, Steve Bannon, happened to be a member
of the board of Cambridge Analytica.94 So, he used Kogan’s app data
for Trump’s election campaign and, consequently, Trump’s
political team crafted the content of Trump’s speeches as well as
many other election campaigning endeavors and narratives
according to the interests and likes of the people whose data was

88. See Olivia Solon, Facebook Says Cambridge Analytica may Have Gained 37m More
Users’
Data,
G UARDIAN
(Apr.
4,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/04/facebook-cambridgeanalytica-user-data-latest-more-than-thought [https://perma.cc/74YR-T8HG].
89. Ian Sherr, Facebook, Cambridge Analytica and Data Mining: What you Need to
Know, CN ET 18 (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-cambridgeanalytica-data-mining-and-trump-what-you-need-to-know/
[https://perma.cc/35CCN3BY].
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See how Facebook users gave their data to Kogan’s app as explained in Andrew
Wyrich, What Is Cambridge Analytica, the Data Firm Connected to the Trump Campaign? R ,
(Mar.
19,
2018)
https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/what-is-cambridge-analytica
[https://perma.cc/E4LF-2QKY]. See also how Kogan shared data with Cambridge
Analytica as explained by Solon, supra note 88.
93. See Solon, supra note 88.
94. The Editorial Board, Facebook Leaves Its Users’ Privacy Vulnerable, N.Y. TIMES,
(Mar. 19, 2018). https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/opinion/facebook-cambridgeanalytica-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/8GM6-HYZV].
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accessed.95 Hence, the attempt to affect the US presidential election
result was made through the theft of the personal data of
thousands of US citizens without their permission.96
It was speculated that Russia might have supported the data
theft and assisted Trump’s political team to access the stolen data
via Cambridge Analytica to pave the way for Trump’s win in the
presidential election.97 Although the investigations were also
made, no conclusive evidence could be traced of the Russian state’s
involvement.98 Nonetheless, the mere speculation of such
interventions raised alarm bells. The likelihood of such
interventions in the future as part of Russia’s information warfare
strategy could not be neglected.99 Therefore, it increased calls to
regulate social media forums, software applications, and other
tools of information warfare to prevent data theft and cyberattacks
from making political disruptions in the future.100 Consequently,
the Honest Ads Act became more strictly enforced all over the
United States.101 This law makes it mandatory for all social media
and software companies to share their policies and procedures
with the US State Department regarding running any kind of
application that could access individuals’ data and could be used
for political purposes.102 Any application that may appear to have
the potential to be used for political purposes, especially any
linkages with foreign political powers, might not be allowed to
operate in the United States.103 Thus, through implementing such
legal enactments, the US governmental agencies are trying to
counter the threats of information warfare that loom over their
95. See Sherr, supra note 89.
96. Id.
97. Id. See Sherr, supra note 89; see also Donna Brazile, Russia’s Interference
Spotlights Weaknesses in US Election Process, in INTERFERENCE IN ELECTIONS 75 (Kristina Lyn
Heitkamp ed., 2018).
98. For details, see the conclusive paragraphs of the article by Sean Illing, Cambridge
Analytica, the Shady Data Firm That Might be a key Trump-Russia Link, Explained, VOX,
(Apr.
4,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/10/16/15657512/cambridge-analytica-facebook-alexander-nixchristopher-wylie [https://perma.cc/D5MA-5PDG].
99. See id.
100. See Brazile, supra note 97.
101. Id.
102. See Sherr, supra note 89.
103. See Brazile, supra note 97, at 75.
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political and security infrastructures.104 As Cambridge Analytica’s
cofounder—Christopher Wylie—said himself regarding the
threats of information warfare in response to the recent data theft
by one of the board members of the firm causing a data-theft
scandal, “Rules don’t matter for them. For them, this is a war, and
it’s all fair. They want to fight a culture war in America. Cambridge
Analytica was supposed to be the arsenal of weapons to fight that
culture war.”105
E. Rhetoric Building of the Masses of the Adversary State
Information warfare often involves the essential purpose of
shaping the narratives of the masses.106 This is done by spreading
manipulated information to them.107 A state or its agencies can
perform this function with or without using the services of media.
For example, within the territorial boundaries of a state, the media
may be used for this purpose.108 However, when a state or its
agencies aim to construct a particular narrative of the people of its
adversary state, they may resort to other covert or overt activities;
for instance, they can send their agents into the adversary state,
disguising their identities and spreading particular narratives
among the general public.109 On the other hand, some other
initiatives—such as establishing nongovernmental organizations
(“NGOs”) in the adversary state—can also work as tools for waging
information operations. Such NGOs may outwardly present their
identities as trustworthy organizations working for the
development of local people, but, underhandedly, they may be
working to spread a particular anti-state narrative among the
masses by simply approaching them.110
104. For example, see how the Pentagon is averting hacking threats as mentioned by
Konkel, supra note 83.
105. See Wyrich, supra note 92.
106. ARMIN KRISHNAN, WHY PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS FAIL 237 (2018).
107. Id.
108. See Abdelal, supra note 45. See also Huhtinen, supra note 41, at 292.
109. See GEOFFREY SMITH, ROYALIST AGENTS, CONSPIRATORS AND SPIES: THEIR ROLE IN THE
BRITISH CIVIL WARS, 1640–1660 8-9 (2013).
110. For example, some NGOs were banned by the Interior Ministry of Pakistan as
they were found to be involved in antistate activities. For details, see Irfan Haider, Pakistan
Will Not Allow NGOs Working Against National Interest: Nisar, DAWN (June 12, 2015),
https://www.dawn.com/news/1187773 [https://perma.cc/G7RU-FDDW].

918

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:4

A unique example of using information warfare to build a
public narrative of an adversary state was used by the United
States in Iraq in 2003.111 The intention of such information warfare
was to pave favorable conditions for its use of force in Iraq, so as to
minimize resistance from Iraqi forces and citizens. A few months
before the United States attacked Iraq, the United States published
manipulated information in pamphlets and flyers and successfully
disseminated them to Iraqi citizens and key army officers.112 The
content of some pamphlets urged Iraqi military officers not to
destroy the oil wells in Iraq on the orders of the then Iraqi
president, Saddam Hussein.113 The pamphlets presented the
narrative that the oil wells were the property of the Iraqi citizens
and, therefore, they must not be destroyed.114 Furthermore, the
pamphlets contended that the United States would protect those
oil wells if Saddam Hussein gave orders to destroy them in the act
of war.115 This is how the United States tried to deceive the Iraqi
people and the international community: by presenting a narrative
that the United States was working for the interests of the Iraqi
citizens, while the Saddam Hussein’s establishment was working
for its own interests. The US government presented the same
narrative to US Citizens to gain support for the aimed attack in
Iraq.116 Hence, through such dissemination of a manipulated
narrative, the United States invaded Iraq and faced no significant
resistance in its takeover of the entire Iraqi territory.117 Ultimately,
the US Army got information about the hideout of Saddam Hussein,
who was arrested by the US military forces and taken to court,
where a trial was held against him that resulted in awarding him a
death sentence.118 Thus, the information warfare launched by the
111. See e.g., Maxie C. Thom, Information Warfare Arms Control: Risks and Costs, INSS
OCCASIONAL
PAPER
45-47
(Mar.
2006),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4d0e/22a368c6afb68a153d6fdb0411f129409c30.pdf?
_ga=2.213952983.1307757924.1583038850-969704245.1580936833
[https://perma.cc/MG4Z-EJD7].
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. For details, see PAUL R. BARTROP, A BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONTEMPORARY
GENOCIDE: PORTRAITS OF EVIL AND GOOD 136 (2012).
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United States months before invading Iraq proved beneficial for
the subsequent use of force by the United States in Iraq.119
F. Information Warfare by Terrorists
Sometimes, terrorist or nonstate actors also use information
warfare to shape a particular narrative among the general public
or among the media agencies.120 For example, the Taliban used
information warfare alongside the lawfare strategy against North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) forces in Afghanistan back
in 2007–08.121 The Taliban used to disguise themselves among the
general public in Afghanistan.122 Hence, when NATO forces
launched military operations or air strikes them, many such
operations resulted in the killing of innocent civilians residing in
the vicinity of the Taliban.123 Consequently, the Taliban used the
lawfare strategy alongside information warfare against NATO
forces to present a demonized picture of the NATO attacks.124
Using lawfare, they invoked international humanitarian law
(“IHL”) and presented a narrative that the NATO forces violated
IHL with their military operations and air strikes, resulting in the
deaths of noncombatant civilians.125 In their information warfare,
they reached out to local and international media agencies and
shared with them the pictures, videos, and locations of the
innocent civilian casualties resulting from the air strikes of the
NATO forces.126 Consequently, the international media agencies,
journalists, and human rights activists denounced the NATO air
119. See Thom, supra note 111, at 46.
120. JANTJE SILOMON, SOFTWARE AS A WEAPON: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE
DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION 106-23 (2018).
121. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian
Values in 21st Conflicts 5, (Carr Ctr. for Hum. Rts. Pol’y, Working Paper, 2001).
122. The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf,
Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts, 911 (Spencer C. Tucker ed., 2010).
123. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st Century Conflicts, 54
J OINT F ORCE Q UARTERLY 34, 36 (2009).
124. Id.
125. Trevor Michael Alfred Logan, International Law and the Use of Lawfare: An
Argument for the U.S. To Adopt a Lawfare Doctrine 8 (MO. ST. U. Graduate Thesis, 2017),
available
at
https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4156&context=theses
[https://perma.cc/GT2G-RPSM].
126. Dunlap, Jr., supra note 121, at 36.
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strikes.127 NATO’s official spokesperson responded to this negative
portrayal of air strikes as the consequence of a “strategic battle” by
the Taliban.128 Ultimately, the NATO forces started hesitating in
rigorously conducting military operations and air-strikes against
the Taliban leaders out of the apprehensions of civilian
casualties.129 This hesitation developed primarily due to the
negative image of the NATO air-strikes construed in Afghanistan
and also due to the fact that the Taliban leaders started residing in
the civilian populous regions.130 Hence, the effectiveness of the
NATO military operations in Afghanistan started to decline.131
Today, as per official claims by the Afghan government, the Taliban
controls over forty-five percent of the territory of Afghanistan,132
though unofficial claims assert that approximately sixty-one
percent of the territory is now controlled by the Taliban and the
remaining thirty-nine percent is under the control of the Afghan
government.133 Thus, information warfare by the Taliban has
deteriorated the effectiveness of the antiterrorist operations of the
NATO and US forces in Afghanistan.
In conclusion, information warfare entails the shaping of the
narratives of the general public using certain tools and sources,
which include mass media agencies including print and electronic
media and social media platforms, software applications for
hacking or stealing data, and other tools such as malware, viruses,
DDoS attacks, etc.134 Disinformation, propaganda, the
dissemination of manipulated information, spreading malware
into adversaries’ important computer software systems, and
stealing confidential and strategically critical datasets are some of
the tactics of information warfare pursued by information
warriors.135 It is not only states but also nonstate actors, including
127. RABBI SIMON ALTAF HAKOHEN, WORLD WAR III - SALVATION OF THE JEWS 66 (2018).
128. Dunlap, Jr., supra note 121, at 36.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Anwer Iqbal, US Govt Misleading Americans on Afghanistan: Report, DAWN
(Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.dawn.com/news/1431814 [https://perma.cc/PNM4UHR2].
133. See Rod Nordland et al., How the US Government Misleads the Public on
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, September 8, 2018.
134. See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–2.
135. Id.
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terrorists and NGOs that employ information warfare techniques
to either pressure or gain advantage over their adversaries.136
Unfortunately, information warfare has spread significantly and is
also modernizing its facets in the contemporary era, which is
posing a challenge to the international legal experts, who ponder
ways to regulate such warfare.137
IV. INFORMATION WARFARE REVOLUTIONIZING WARFARE IN
THE CONTEMPORARY ERA
Due to the novel strategies adopted by the information
warfare, the hybrid warfare has become even more effective.138
This effectiveness is also influenced by the fact that the tactics of
information warfare can also be adopted in hybrid warfare.139
Thus, whenever the information warfare is waged alongside
hybrid warfare or alongside the conventional warfare, it boosts the
warfare strategy. This Part will elucidate the revolution that
information warfare has brought to the arena of war in the modern
era.
A. Waging War Without the Conventional Use of Force
The prevalent adoption of the tactics of information warfare
by states and nonstate actors has led to a revolution in warfare in
the contemporary era.140 The key feature of this revolution in
warfare is that information warfare does not rely on the use of
conventional military force and can cause significant intangible
damage to an adversary even without the use of force.141 Such
intangible damage may not be imposed on the adversary by the use
of force.142 Furthermore, the intangible damage is not protected by
the international law of armed conflict or by IHL.143 Information
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
See Johnson, supra note 9, at 453.
See Furgacz, supra note 3, at 207.
Id.
See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4. See also ADRIAN R. LEWIS, THE AMERICAN
CULTURE OF WAR: A HISTORY OF US MILITARY FORCE FROM WORLD WAR II TO OPERATION
ENDURING FREEDOM 387 (2006).
141. See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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warfare relies on several other methods such as propaganda
through media, DDoS attacks, virus attacks, hacking, and
defamation through media or social media.144 None of these
information operations require the use of conventional military
force.
In particular, when the military command and control system
of an adversary state is attacked and damaged through malware or
viruses, then such an attack causes significant damage in terms of
tarnishing the reputation of the strength of the national defense
system of that adversary state, as well as in making the security of
that state vulnerable to cyberattacks.145 Consequently, the
adversary state may never engage itself in any armed endeavor
with another state unless it has reapplied the security on its
military command and control system.146 In sum, the malware
attack on the military command and control systems of an
adversary state without the use of actual military force is strong
enough to deter any war or armed attack by that adversary state.
A repeat attack by information warriors on its security would
further imperil its security and defenses from malware attacks and
further put it into a position of significant strategic disadvantage
compared to its adversaries. Thus, the effectiveness of information
warfare shows how substantially and situationally the wager of
information operations can defeat its adversary by simply using
malware or virus attacks. This further illustrates how substantially
information warfare has revolutionized and altered the face of
warfare in the modern era.147
B. Making the Internet the Battlefield
Information warfare is making the internet or cyberspace the
combat zone, replacing conventional battlefields.148 The
information operations executed in the arena of information
warfare do not require the presence of physical combat zones or
real battlegrounds.149 For instance, the use of social media and
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
Id. at 1.
Id.
See Lewis, supra note 140.
GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
Id. at 2.
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electronic media for disseminating propaganda and
disinformation against an adversary, the spread of malware into
the strategically or economically important computer systems or
military command and control systems of an adversary, the
intrusion into the cyberspace of the adversary and the theft of
strategically important data of the adversary, etc. are some of the
examples of such information operations.150
C. Augmenting the Effect of use of Force in the Event of an Armed
Conflict
Information warfare can also be deployed along with the
conventional use of force.151 In such an event, information warfare
would enhance the impacts of the use of force.152 For example, as
mentioned in the previous section, the United States used
information warfare in disseminating pamphlets in Iraq months
before attacking Iraq in 2003. That proved successful in fulfilling
the objectives of the United States to minimize resistance from
Iraqi forces and from Iraqi citizens, which helped the US forces to
take over the entire Iraqi territory with no significant trouble.153
It is pertinent to mention here that information warfare
tactics—when waged alongside the conventional use of military
force in an armed attack against an adversary—can cause immense
damage to the adversary and can give the attacker a significant
competitive advantage over the adversary in an armed conflict. For
instance, the attacker can introduce malware into jet fighter
computer systems, which may cause them to behave abnormally
or crash, causing colossal financial losses to the adversary,154 or
putting their air force at a significant competitive disadvantage.155
Thus, information operations when deployed alongside the use of
force can make the latter more potent and impactful in an armed
conflict against an adversary.
150. Id.
151. See Thom, supra note 111, at 46.
152. Markku Jokisipila, E-Jihad, Cyberterrorism and Freedom of Speech, in WAR,
VIRTUAL WAR AND SOCIETY: THE CHALLENGE TO COMMUNITIES 94 (Andrew R. Wilson & Mark L.
Perry eds., 2008).
153. See Thom, supra note 111, at 46.
154. See Robbat, supra note 7, at 13.
155. Id.
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D. Information Warfare as an Element of Hybrid Warfare
Hybrid warfare is a mixture of different overt and covert
activities carried out with or without the use of conventional
military force.156 Hybrid warfare also employs kinetic and nonkinetic, asymmetric, and unconventional means of warfare as part
of its hybrid strategy.157 In this regard, hybrid warfare also
employs information as a weapon waged by an entity against its
adversary.158 In such a scenario, information as a weapon is waged
as propaganda, disinformation, fake news, or defamation.159 All of
these activities are also the tactics of information warfare, creating
an overlapping of strategies between hybrid warfare and
information warfare.160 As hybrid warfare is a broader spectrum of
strategies involving the tactics of information warfare, it can be
asserted that information warfare is an element of hybrid
warfare.161 Concomitantly, several states as well as nonstate actors
are using information warfare in their endeavors of hybrid warfare
against their adversaries.162
Information warfare tactics, when employed in hybrid
warfare, make hybrid warfare more lethal and severe.163 For
instance, when certain activities such as propaganda is waged
through news or social media against an adversary, then it can
have the tendency to malice the reputation of the adversary.164 In
particular, when propaganda is spread out in a way that it creates
a convincing air among the viewers against the adversary, then the

156. Ambassador Sorin Dumitru Ducaru, Framing NATO’s Approach to Hybrid
Warfare, in COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM UKRAINE 4 (Niculae Iancu
et al. eds., 2016).
157. See Andrés B. Muñoz Mosquera & Sascha Dov Bachmann, Understanding
Lawfare in a Hybrid Warfare Context, 37 NATO LEGAL GAZETTE 22 (2016).
158. See Furgacz, supra note 3.
159. Id. See also Barna, supra note 4.
160. See Barna, supra note 4.
161. Id. See also Furgacz, supra note 3.
162. See Barna, supra note 4.
163. For example, see how the Russia made its hybrid war in Ukraine more stringent
and effective in Ukraine because Russia captured the entire Crimean region, as described
in: Sascha Dov Bachmann & Andres B. Munoz Mosquera, Hybrid Warfare as Lawfare:
Towards a Comprehensive Legal Approach, in A CIVIL-MILITARY RESPONSE TO HYBRID THREATS
67 (Eugenio Cusumano & Marian Corbe eds., 2017).
164. Id.
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reputation of the adversary becomes tarnished causing it to lose
support from the international community.165
On the other hand, when other information warfare tactics
such as DDoS attacks and hacking are employed in an armed
conflict, then the adversary is put into a position of competitive
disadvantage in the conflict.166 For instance, if the command and
control system of an adversary is attacked through DDoS attacks
or hacking and is controlled against the adversary, then the
adversary may face significant damage.167 This will also put the
adversary into a losing position in an armed conflict. Similarly,
when the adversary is unable to defend its strategic computer
systems from the DDOS attacks, then such an attack damages the
reputation of the strength of the defense system of the
adversary.168 The damage to the repute puts the adversary into a
position of competitive and strategic disadvantage against its
rivals.169 Thus, the information operations of DDoS attacks will
become an element of hybrid warfare due to the covert nature of
the operation. The situation will then highlight that a DDoS attack
may have installed the hybrid warfare against the affected party
through employing information operations.
In sum, information warfare has revolutionized the facets of
conventional warfare.170 It has taken the warfare out of the
conventional battlefield and into the arena of the internet.171
Cyberspace has become the new battlespace, where information
warriors can, without shedding opposing soldiers’ blood, cause
significant intangible damage to an adversary by destroying its
reputation, by stealing its strategically important data, or by
making its security systems vulnerable to attacks.172 Furthermore,
information warfare has given support to the overt and covert

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. See also Furgacz, supra note 3.
See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–2.
See Lewis, supra note 140.
See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
Id.
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operability of hybrid warfare.173 Notably, information warfare has
also enhanced the lethality of hybrid warfare in the contemporary
era.174 States and nonstate actors now wage hybrid warfare by only
relying upon information warfare tactics and using information as
a weapon against their adversaries.175 Hence, information warfare
has made hybrid warfare as easier.176
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFORMATION WARFARE
This Part of the Article includes an explanation of the relevant
rules of international law that can be applied to the sphere of
information warfare. Some of these rules—for instance the Outer
Space Treaty 1967—end up indirectly facilitating the conditions
that support the continuation of information warfare, leaving
information warfare unchecked under international law. On the
other hand, the complex and variegated arena of information
warfare makes it challenging for international norms and
principles to regulate and control information operations.177 For
instance, although the law of war, the law of armed conflict, and
IHL make attempts to regulate the conduct of actors involved in
information warfare, the intangibility of the damage caused by
information warfare makes it difficult for IHL to impose
restrictions on information warfare.178
A. The Law of War
The law of war or the law of armed conflict protects civilians
and noncombatants in an armed conflict.179 Likewise, the law of
war also attempts to protect civilians from any information
warfare attack. That is, the parties engaged in information warfare
173. For example, see how the disinformation campaign by Russia helped it to
achieve its objective in its hybrid warfare endeavor in Ukraine, as described in Bachmann
& Mosquera, supra note 163, at 67.
174. See, e.g., id.
175. See Furgacz, supra note 3. See also Barna, supra note 4.
176. For example, see how the Russia achieved its objective in Crimea, as described
in Bachmann & Mosquera, supra note 163, at 67.
177. See Robbat, supra note 7, at 8. See also GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at iii.
178. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
179. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 29 (2004).
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must cause no harm to the civilian population.180 This rule can be
applied to the activity of hacking or the disruption of any
technological transmission of an adversary state by a wager of
information warfare.181 If such an activity harms civilians in any
manner—for instance in disrupting their businesses, daily
routines, etc.—then such an activity ought to be considered illegal
under IHL or the law of war.182 Several other inferences can
similarly be made that could ensure protection for civilians and
noncombatants.183
B. Challenges Faced by International Law in Regulating
Information Warfare
In fact, there are many challenges faced by international law,
in particular by IHL or the law of war, in regulating information
warfare.184 These challenges mainly derive from the intangibility
of the damage brought up by information warfare. Unfortunately,
because of such challenges, international law becomes paralyzed
in an attempt to regulate or control the broad and complicated field
of information warfare.185
1. Intangibility
The essential challenge to international law posed by
information warfare is the intangibility of the damage caused by
the information operations instituted by an entity against its
adversary.186 International law, in particular the international law
of armed conflict, is silent on any intangible damage caused to an
adversary in times of war and peace.187 Therefore, it becomes
difficult for international law to regulate or restrict those
information operations that specifically produce intangible
damages in times of war and peace.188
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 12.
Id.
Robbat, supra note 7, at 8.
See Johnson, supra note 9, at 453.
GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
Id.
Id.
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a. Unregulated Intangible Damage
What exactly is included under the term “intangible damage”
varies according to the mode of information operation launched
against an adversary; for instance, when the media is used to wage
propaganda against an adversary or when social media is relied on
for defaming an adversary, the intangibility resides in damaging
the reputation of the adversary.189 On the other hand, when
disinformation is used as a weapon of information warfare, it is
intangible in terms of depriving the people of the true information
and facts about a certain aspect or activity in times of war or peace.
In all of these instances, the damage is not physical or tangible,
which ultimately excludes the principles of international law as
inapplicable to such situations.190 Consequently, it becomes
impossible to regulate such activities of information warfare
pursued by an entity against its adversary.191
b. Intangibility Leading to Tangible Damage
There are certain exceptions in which the intangible damage
sometimes leads to tangible damage as well. For instance, when the
cyberspace of the adversary is intruded via introducing malware
or a virus to the strategically important software systems of an
adversary, the intangible damage can produce some tangible loss
in terms of damage of infrastructure or loss of human lives.192 For
example, hacking the jet fighters of an adversary or attacking them
with malware can cause colossal financial loss as well as human
casualties.193 However, international law does not provide
sufficient guidance on such conduct of states in times of war and
fails to restrict such activities unless they result in harming
noncombatants.194 Thus, in reality, there exist significant gaps in
international law in regulating the activities of information
warfare.195

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4-5.
Id. at 4.
See Johnson, supra note 9, at 453.
See Robbat, supra note 7, at 13.
Id.
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Id. See also Johnson, supra note 9, at 453.
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2. The Inherent Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression
When information warriors use the media or social media to
wage propaganda or spread disinformation among the public, then
the individual’s right to freedom of opinion and expression
becomes relevant in providing the freedom to information
warriors in using the media or social media to spread the
narratives they prefer against their adversary.196 The right to
freedom of opinion and expression is protected under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the United
Nations in 1948.197 The text of Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights affirms the right in the following
words: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.”198 In particular,
Article 19 permits no interference in the freedom of expression of
an individual.199 The part of the text stating “freedom to hold
opinions without interference,” thus, makes it challenging for
international law to restrict any opinion or expression that is
expressed within the spirit of Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.200
As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an essential
element of customary international law, it is therefore customary
international law that promotes the right to freedom of opinion
and expression.201 This assertion further restricts international
law in regulating or controlling any activity of information
warriors carried out in pursuance of their right to freedom of
opinion and expression. The only thing that can prevent them from
exploiting their right to freedom of opinion and expression for
information warfare is the adversary legally proving their
196. See, e.g., NANCY SNOW, THE ARROGANCE OF AMERICAN POWER: WHAT U.S. LEADERS
ARE DOING WRONG AND WHY IT’S OUR DUTY TO DISSENT 3 (2007).
197. See TIM CROOK, COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW AND ETHICS 33 (2009).
198. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES, MATERIALS,
COMMENTARY 50 (2010). See also MARTIN DIXON, CASES & MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
209 (2016).
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expression of opinion to be defamatory by filing lawsuits against
them in a court following the international legal protocols.202
Through this, information warriors can be legally restricted in
expressing their opinions if such opinions are proved legally in
court to be hate crime or utterly defamatory.203 Otherwise, the
inherent right to freedom of opinion and expression is exploited or
misused by information warriors as a weapon. Hence, the
relationship between the tactics of information warfare and the
right to freedom of opinion and expression under Article 19 of the
UDHR becomes challenging for international law, preventing it
from regulating and controlling information warfare. This leads to
a perpetual continuation of information operations by states and
nonstate actors against their adversaries.
3. The Outer Space Treaty and the CHM Principle
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, commonly known as the Outer Space
Treaty, was formally ratified in October 1967.204 According to this
treaty, space and all celestial objects are the common heritage of
the whole of mankind.205 A similar principle has been presented by
the Moon Treaty, which was approved in 1979.206 According to the
Moon Treaty, the moon and all its resources are the common
property of the whole of mankind.207 Therefore, from these two
treaties, it can be asserted that space and the resources of its
celestial objects including the moon are free to use.208 This
assertion was given under the CHM principle, which states that any
object or property that is common to the whole of mankind must
202. For instance, see some examples and discussion about defamation cases as
described in DAVID STRECKFUSS, TRUTH ON TRIAL IN THAILAND: DEFAMATION, TREASON, AND
LÈSE-MAJESTÉ 1 (2010).
203. See id. at 414.
204. Stephan Hobe, Technological Development as a Challenge for the Development of
Air and Space Law, in A NEW INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 296 (Chia-Jui Cheng ed., 2016).
See also FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW 53 (2016).
205. See also PRUE TAYLOR, AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW:
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 259 (2008).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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be free to be used by all nations.209 The CHM principle alongside
the Outer Space Treaty is applicable to information warfare,
because most information operations are carried out through the
transmission of radio waves, which travel through space.210 That
is, whether it is the telecasting of news from a radio or television
channel, the spreading of information through social media
platforms, or the intrusion of cyberspace through hacking via the
internet, radio waves are employed, transmitted from artificial
satellites sent to space by the major international
telecommunication agencies or by some governments.211 Hence,
whenever any of the aforementioned activities of information
warfare take place, space becomes the medium of transmission of
radio waves and, hence, facilitates the pathways of information
operations. Concomitantly, as, in accordance with the Outer Space
Treaty and the CHM principle, space is the common property of the
entire mankind and is free to use for all humanity, the utilization of
space is therefore free for everyone, even for carrying out
information warfare operations.212 Hence, indirectly, the Outer
Space Treaty and the CHM principle provide legal protection for
the continuation of information warfare operations.
Thus, international law has stringent limitations in regulating
the sphere of information warfare.213 The limitations are mainly
attributed to the intangibility of the damage caused by information
warfare.214 The intangibility is not addressed in the international
law of armed conflict; therefore, how to regulate the arena of
information warfare becomes uncertain.215 Furthermore,
international protection of the inherent right to freedom of opinion
and expression—as constituted in Article 19 of the UDHR—further
consolidates the inability in international law to regulate certain
209. GILLIAN DOREEN TRIGGS & JOHN ROBERT VICTOR PRESCOTT, INTERNATIONAL
FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES: LAW, POLITICS AND GEOGRAPHY 402 (2008).
210. For instance, as described by Medoff and Kaye that every media company relies
on satellite telecommunication for transmission of information. Satellite communication
employs radio waves. For details, see NORMAN J. MEDOFF & BARBARA KAYE, ELECTRONIC
MEDIA: THEN, NOW, AND LATER 9 (2016).
211. See id. See also DIANE POREMSKY & SHERRY KINKOPH GUNTER, OUTLOOK 2013
ABSOLUTE BEGINNER’S GUIDE 46 (2013).
212. See TAYLOR, supra note 205.
213. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 453.
214. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
215. Id.
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information operations such as the waging of propaganda against
an adversary through media or social media.216 Additionally, the
Outer Space Treaty and the CHM principle allow the dissemination
of information through the radio waves transmitted from the
artificial satellites sent into space, even if such information is
deployed or used by information warriors in their respective
information operations.217 Thus, indirectly, or inadvertently,
international law appears to facilitate information operations
instead of regulating or controlling them. Therefore, it has become
problematic for international legal experts to devise ways to
control information operations.218
VI. SUGGESTIONS TO REGULATE INFORMATION WARFARE
The legal challenges in regulating information warfare need
to be addressed and evaluated by the international community to
control the threatening rise of information operations by states
and nonstate actors waging information warfare or hybrid warfare
against their adversaries. This Part of the Article includes some
suggestions for paving the way to regulating information warfare
to bring it under the legal authority of international law. One
suggestion is to enact new laws, rules, and principles as well as to
draft a new convention to not only regulate information warfare
but also eliminate the challenges caused by the other treaties and
principles of international law in controlling the arena of
information warfare.219
A. Enact New Laws, Rules, and Principles
At present, there is no particular set of rules or policies under
the wide umbrella of international law that could define or regulate
information operations.220 The legal vacuum is massive in this
regard, and it needs to be closed to discourage the harmful
employment of information warfare.221 This vacuum can be filled
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See UDHR, supra note 198, art. 19.
See MEDOFF & KAYE, supra note 210. See also TAYLOR, supra note 205.
GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
See Johnson, supra note 9, at 439.
Id.
See Johnson, supra note 9, at 453.
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if new rules or principles are devised under the umbrella of
international law to regulate the conduct of parties engaged in
information warfare.222 For this purpose, the existing laws and
principles pertaining to curbing hate speech can be made the
foundations for enacting the new laws.223 A pertinent collaboration
of the international community might prove helpful in this regard
as certain states, e.g., European and Scandinavian states, may share
their successful experiences in curbing hate speech,
disinformation, and propaganda in their domestic arenas.224 Here,
states should also collaborate with one another to discuss various
aspects, tools, and areas on which special legal controls are
required for regulating the complicated arena of information
warfare.225 For instance, the use of the media to disseminate false
information is an active platform for the wagers of information
warfare against their adversaries.226 Therefore, this platform has
to be analyzed and then carefully regulated in a manner that not
only protects the necessary freedom of opinion and expression, but
also controls any kind of negative activity pursued through the
media within the sphere of information warfare. It is suggested
that a special code of conduct has to be formulated at the
international level, drafted particularly for the international news
media agencies, to prevent or criminalize the propagation of

222. Id. at 439.
223. For example, as described in this book about the defamation laws controlling
hate speech: STRECKFUSS, supra note 202, at 1 (see also pages 103 and 414 of the same book.
Such laws can be enacted and made prominent at the international level for regulating the
hate speech, defamation, and disinformation activities of information warriors).
224. Western European nations and Scandinavian states have been regarded as
having adopted the laws curbing hate speeches alongside protecting the freedom of
opinion and expression. The legislators of these nations should be consulted about new
rules and principles for regulating the activities of information war. For details about EU
hate speech laws, see Sejal Parmer, The Legal Framework for Addressing “Hate Speech” in
Europe, at 3, presented in Addressing Hate Speech in the Media: The Role of Regulatory
Authorities and the Judiciary, in the International Conference Organized by Council of
Europe in Partnership with the Croatian Agency for Electronic Media (Nov. 6–7, 2018).
225. For instance, see a recent special regulation in Europe for curbing hate speech:
William New, New EU Directive Limits Hate Speech, Establishes European Content Quotas,
I NTELL . P ROP . W ATCH (Nov. 6, 2018,) https://www.ip-watch.org/2018/11/06/new-eudirective-limits-hate-speech-establishes-european-content-quotas
[https://perma.cc/DF5D-7QDB].
226. For example, as described by Vuuren et al., supra note 17, at 127.

934

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:4

propaganda and hate speech.227 The new regulations should
include the curbing of negative propaganda against states,
religions, races, ethnic communities, etc. Whether such a policy is
implemented assertively or normatively is another question to be
dealt with and one that the international community has to decide
after evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each
strategy. Nonetheless, the rules and principles aiming at curbing
fake news, hate speech, and propaganda may be implemented in a
normative sense, but their normativity may make them assertive
in the future if the entire international community or even the
United Nations ends up positively endorsing them. Thus, in the
same way, all other aspects of information warfare can be dealt
with and regulated.
B. Arrange a New Convention: The Need of the Hour
At present, there is no single convention on the issue of
regulating information warfare.228 On the other hand, states and
nonstate actors have started actively relying on the use of
information warfare tactics against their rivals,229 which poses a
serious threat to international peace and security. In particular
when terrorists wage information—as the Taliban benefitted from
resorting to information warfare alongside their lawfare strategy
against the NATO forces in Afghanistan,230— it consequently
undermines the effectiveness of operations against them. As
previously stated, the Taliban now have control of nearly half of
the territory of Afghanistan.231 Thus, because of such threats,
international legal experts have raised their voices and scholars
endorse the arrangement of a new international policy or
convention to regulate the growing phenomenon of information
warfare in the contemporary era.232 Though these calls have not
227. For example, as such a policy has been recently implemented in Europe. For
details, see New, supra note 225.
228. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 453.
229. Cristian Barna, The Road to Jihad in Syria: Using SOCMINT to Counter the
Radicalization of Muslin Youth in Romania, in COUNTERING RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT
EXTREMISM AMONG YOUTH TO PREVENT TERRORISM 193 (Marco Lombardi et al. eds., 2015).
230. Dunlap, Jr., supra note 121, at 36.
231. Nordland et al., supra note 133.
232. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 439.
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gained momentum so far, the rationality and practicality behind
them are quite convincing, and the world needs to consider this
earnestly.233
If the calls for a new convention on regulating information
warfare are heard positively and a new convention is arranged,
then the convention would provide a new and rigorous forum for
analyzing and regulating the different arenas of information
warfare. In particular, it would provide a special forum for states,
legal experts, and the bodies of international law to discuss the
various aspects of information warfare and listen to one another’s
suggestions for regulating it. Consequently, they could
unanimously devise a new code of conduct or rules to regulate
information operations.234 Additionally, it would also close the
existing loopholes in international law, which are indirectly
facilitating information warfare—for instance the Outer Space
Treaty235. Hence, it is the need of the hour to arrange a new
convention to bring information warfare under the authority of
international legal norms, rules, or principles, as doing so will help
mitigate the threats posed by information operations to
international peace and security.236
VII. CONCLUSION
In the contemporary era of technological advancement,
information warfare is being deployed by states and nonstate
actors against their adversaries.237 Information warfare entails the
dissemination of manipulated information or the access to
particular information and then using that information to acquire
competitive advantage over an adversary.238 Some examples of
information warfare include the spreading of propaganda or
disinformation through the use of mass media, the spread of
malware or viruses into computerized military command and
control systems or other strategically important institutions, the
theft of important data via hacking, and the demonization of the
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 453.
See Johnson, supra note 9, at 439.
Id.
Id.
See Barna, supra note 4.
Id. See also Nitu, supra note 6.

936

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:4

reputation of an adversary via the use of electronic media or social
media platforms.239
All of these tactics of information warfare are revolutionizing
the face of warfare in the current era.240 The war is now being
waged on new fronts, particularly on technological fronts, because
states and institutions have recognized the importance of
strengthening the security systems of their strategically important
datasets and computer systems.241 The threat from hackers is
prevalent and massive; they can cause a significant amount of
damage, ranging from destroying a reputation to causing huge
financial losses and theft of confidential data reports.242 For this
purpose, state institutions are deploying special security measures
to avert the threats of information warfare.243
Certain tactics of information warfare can prove to be deadly
for international peace and security; for instance, disinformation
and propaganda are tactics that can aggravate tensions among
adversary states, leading to conflict if the states get engaged in
perpetual propaganda wars against each other.244 Furthermore,
the tactics of information warfare when deployed by terrorist
organizations can also cause detrimental damage to regional or
international peace.245 The situation may be very critical if the
terrorists get their hands on the hacking strategy and can spread
malware or viruses or take control remotely over the strategically
important computer systems of an adversary state.246 In such an
event, the threat to regional peace and damage to the reputation of
the security of the state could be massive. Therefore, it is the need
of the hour to regulate the tactics of information warfare before it
gets too late to do so.
Nonetheless, despite the aforementioned threats to
international peace and security, there has unfortunately been no
mechanism, policy, or set of rules devised at the international level
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
note 83.
244.
245.
246.

See Nitu, supra note 6. See also GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
See LEWIS, supra note 140.
See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
See, e.g., Greenberg et al., supra note 1, at 2.
For example, see how the Pentagon is averting hacking threats in Konkel, supra
See Konkel, supra note 83.
See id.
See id.
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that could regulate the arena of information warfare.247 Moreover,
there is not even a single convention under the wide umbrella of
international law so far that has discussed the need to regulate or
control information warfare.248 Although there have been calls
raised by a number of legal experts to draft a new convention
under the authority of international law to regulate the arena of
information warfare, such calls have not gained momentum so
far.249 A trend seen over the past few decades has been that the
international community does not take into consideration calls for
drafting a separate convention on any issue unless that particular
issue becomes global and very significant in nature.250 Thus, no
special efforts have yet been made to draft either a separate
convention or special rules that could hear the calls to regulate
information warfare.251 It can only be hoped that—if not at
present, then in the future—the calls to regulate information
warfare will gain momentum.
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